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_________________ 
DEBATE 
_________________ 
THE GREAT DIVORCE:  THE CURRENT UNDERSTANDING  
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE ORIGINAL  
MEANING OF THE INCOMPATIBILITY CLAUSE 
In this lively Debate, Seth Barrett Tillman and Professor Steven 
Calabresi consider the possibility of a joint senate-presidential office-
holding.   Tillman makes the bold assertion that there is no constitu-
tional bar to President-elect Obama retaining his Senate seat.  Though 
the President-elect has, in fact, relinquished his seat in the Senate, 
Tillman argues that this debate is about more than incompatible of-
fice-holdings because “it also has clear implications for our under-
standing of the reach of” several related constitutional provisions.  
Treating the text formalistically, Tillman carefully parses the Constitu-
tion’s Incompatibility Clause (which restricts a member of either 
house of Congress from “holding any Office under the United 
States”), other related clauses, and the meaning of the words “officer” 
and “office,” to reach the conclusion that the presidency is not “an Of-
fice under the United States.”  Thus, Tillman maintains, the Incom-
patibility Clause poses no bar to a joint office-holding. 
Citing other constitutional provisions that are understood to refer 
to the President as an “officer” of the United States (such as the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause), Professor Calabresi counters that Tillman 
has “made an ingenious argument for an utterly implausible proposi-
tion” that “is contrary to the plain meaning of the constitutional text 
and to the way we have done things for eight hundred years.”  
Calabresi argues that, under an originalist reading, the terms “office” 
and “officer” should be read according to “what the ordinary citizen 
on the street would have thought words meant.”  Because Tillman’s 
reading is “too subtle by half,” Calabresi asserts that it would create “a 
bizarre conflict of interest—a conflict of interest unprecedented in 
the last eight hundred years.” 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
Why President-Elect Obama May Keep His Senate Seat  
After Assuming the Presidency 
Seth Barrett Tillman† 
If there was any doubt before, there can be no doubt now, post-
Heller, we are all originalists now—at least those of us who wish to re-
main relevant and within the mainstream of our ever-evolving judicial 
culture.  Originalism—as I conceive it—is about connecting the issues 
posed by today’s controversies to our historical and textual constitu-
tional past.  What that “past” says is, of course, highly contested.  In 
the next few pages I will argue that our modern understanding of 
separation of powers is not connected to 1787-–1789.  (Rather, it was 
an invention of commentators and jurists at the beginning of the Era 
of Good Feeling.)  Today, for example, any number of influential 
modern commentators (i.e., Akhil Reed Amar, Vikram David Amar, 
John C. Harrison, John F. Manning, and my interlocutor here, Steven 
G. Calabresi) have written that the Constitution’s Incompatibility 
Clause precludes joint senate-presidential office-holding.  That is 
wrong—at least, as a matter of original public meaning.  Rather, the 
Incompatibility Clause precludes a Senator from holding an office 
subject to the President’s appointment (and removal) power, but not 
from being President.  See Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appoint-
ments Clauses:  Statutory Qualifications for Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 745, 779 (2008) (“The Incompatibility Clause sets a limit 
both on membership in Congress and on holding an appointed of-
fice—namely, that the same person cannot do both at the same time.” 
(emphasis added)).  With the inauguration in only a few days, the 
question is unusually relevant, and the intellectual stakes here are po-
tentially quite high.  The debate here is about incompatible office-
holding, but it is about more than that.  It also has clear implications 
for our understanding of the reach of related constitutional provi-
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sions, including:  the Impeachment Clause, the Commissions Clause, 
the Appointments Clause, the Foreign Emoluments Clause, the Presi-
dential Compensation Clause, the Elector Incompatibility Clause, and 
the Succession Clause—all of which use language similar to that of the 
Incompatibility Clause.  But at a higher level of generality, this is really 
a debate about America’s (constitutional and intellectual) past and 
who owns it:  the modern purposivists or more traditional formalists—
and where the intellectual loyalties of self-styled (left, right, and cen-
ter) originalists really do lie. 
Let’s start with the text.  Article I, Section 6, Clause 2 provides: 
[The Ineligibility Clause :]  No Senator or Representative shall, 
during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any 
civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which 
shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall 
have been encreased during such time; and 
[The Incompatibility Clause :]  [N]o Person holding any Office 
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House 
during his Continuance in Office. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (emphasis added).  As for the Ineligibility 
Clause, it simply does not apply to President-elect Obama.  First, the 
office of President was not created during the Senator’s current term.  
It was created circa 1788-–1789.  Second, the emoluments have not 
been raised since 2001, that is, a time prior to the start of Senator 
Obama’s current term.  And, third, the Ineligibility Clause only pre-
cludes a Senator from holding “appointed” office; Presidents, by con-
trast, are “elected” or “chosen,” not “appointed.”  See U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 1, cls. 1, 3; id. amend. XII.  If you think the latter is a distinc-
tion without a difference, that might be because our judicial and law 
school culture has miseducated the largest swathe of our citizens to 
undervalue democratic institutions and the very language of democ-
ratic culture.  Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (distinguishing 
“elected” members from “appointed” officers), with Steven G. 
Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office:  Separation of Powers 
or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1083 (1994) (list-
ing President George Bush and Vice President Al Gore as persons “re-
cently appointed to executive . . . offices”), and Richard D. Friedman, 
Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1720 
n.72 (1988) (“Probably not much weight should be put on the term 
‘appointment’ . . . .”). 
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Whether the Incompatibility Clause precludes joint legislative-
presidential office-holding is a closer question.  Simply put, if the 
presidency is an “Office under the United States,” then joint senate-
presidential office-holding is precluded, but if the presidency is not an 
“Office under the United States,” then there is no (express) prohibi-
tion against such joint office-holding, and President Obama may keep 
his Senate seat. 
Here, because of space considerations, I am going to touch upon 
only three clauses to make the case that the presidency is not an “Of-
fice under the United States.”  However, I maintain that the view pre-
sented here is consistent with each and every other clause of the Con-
stitution of 1787. 
The Impeachment Clause.  Article II, Section 4 provides:  “The Presi-
dent, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be re-
moved from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 4 (emphasis added).  As Justice Story explained in his Commentaries, 
this clause does not say “all other civil Officers” of the United States.  2 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 791 (1833).  Moreover, the word “other” was known to the 
Founders—it is used throughout the Constitution, and even in an-
other phrase in the Impeachment Clause itself.  If, as Professors Akhil 
Amar, Vikram Amar, and Steven Calabresi have suggested, i.e., the 
phrases “Officers of the United States” and “Officers under the United 
States” are coextensive, then the language of the Impeachment Clause 
suggests that the President and the Vice President are neither “Offi-
cers of the United States,” as used in the Impeachment Clause, nor 
“Office[rs] under the United States,” as that phrase is used in the In-
compatibility Clause.  See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is 
the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 114-
15 (1995) (“As a textual matter, each of these five formulations seem-
ingly describes the same stations (apart from the civil/military distinc-
tion)—the modifying terms ‘of,’ ‘under,’ and ‘under the Authority of’ 
are essentially synonymous.”); Calabresi & Larsen, One Person, One Of-
fice, supra, at 1062-63 (noting that the Incompatibility Clause refers to 
“Office under the United States,” but stating that it “impos[es] a dis-
ability on ‘Officers of the United States’”); cf. Steven G. Calabresi, The 
Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 160 
(1995) (“The Constitution does not contemplate a weird [! ] distinc-
tion between ‘Officers of the United States’ [as used in the Appoint-
ments Clause] and ‘Officers of the Government of the United States’ 
[as used in the Necessary and Proper Clause].”). 
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Furthermore, when one stops to consider that in early drafts of 
the Impeachment Clause the word “other” immediately preceded 
“civil Officers,” but it was taken out by the Committee of Style, then 
the absence of the word “other” from the final draft does not appear 
to be accidental or happenstance.  Rather it appears to be a distinct 
choice. 
The Commissions Clause.  Article II, Section 3 provides:  “[The Presi-
dent] . . . shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).  All means all.  If the President 
were an officer of the United States, then President George Washing-
ton should have self-commissioned, and Presidents starting with John 
Adams should have received commissions from their predecessors.  
Simply put, that is not the practice and has never been the practice.  
Nor does there appear to be any eighteenth-century discussion sug-
gesting that it should be the practice. 
Again, if the term “Officers of the United States” is coextensive 
with “Officers under the United States,” as suggested by modern 
commentators including the Amars and Professor Calabresi, then it 
(again) seems to follow that the Incompatibility Clause does not apply 
to the President. 
The Foreign Emoluments Clause.  “[N]o Person holding any Office of 
Profit or Trust under the[] [United States], shall, without the Consent 
of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of 
any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added).  The “under the United 
States” language here closely tracks the “under the United States” lan-
guage of the Incompatibility Clause.  And modern commentators have 
held that this clause applies to the presidency (notwithstanding the 
presence of a wholly separate emoluments clause applying exclusively 
to the President).  See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITU-
TION:  A BIOGRAPHY 182 (2005) (“[T]he more general language of Ar-
ticle I, section 9 barred all federal officers, from the President on 
down, from accepting any ‘present’ or ‘Emolument’ of ‘any kind 
whatever’ from a foreign government without special congressional 
consent.”). 
However, in 1790, the Marquis de Lafayette, an officer of the 
French revolutionary government, sent President George Washington 
a gift:  the main key to the Bastille.  There is no record of Washington 
ever having asked for Congress’s consent to keep the gift.  Why?  One 
2008] The Great Divorce 139 
possibility is that Washington considered the gift to be a personal gift 
from Lafayette, his adopted son in all but law.  But even if that were 
the case, Washington was very sensitive in matters relating to proce-
dural regularity and appearance.  And after all, surely Congress would 
have consented had Washington asked.  Moreover, even if he consid-
ered it a personal gift, others, including his political opponents, may 
not have.  Where is there a record of a complaint lodged against the 
President in a House floor speech or in a popular pamphlet? 
The better view, I believe, is that Washington never asked for 
Congress’s consent because he never thought that he, the elected 
Chief Magistrate, the holder of an Article VI public trust, could be 
confused with a mere creature, an officer under the United States 
(i.e., a statutory or appointed officer).  He never asked for Congress’s 
consent because he never imagined that he was an officer under the 
United States.  It seems Washington once expressed such a view:  “The 
impossibility that one man should be able to perform all the great 
business of the State, I take to have been the reason for instituting the 
great Departments, and appointing officers therein, to assist the su-
preme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust.”  Letter from 
George Washington to Eléonor François Élie, Comte de Moustier 
(May 25, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 333, 
334 ( John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (emphasis added).  “Trust,” not 
“office.”  Interestingly, it appears that James Madison was aware of the 
difficulty of properly categorizing the President (or, at least, an acting 
President) as an officer or as a trustee.  Madison was aware of the dif-
ficulty, but he took no concrete position (which for a careful man—
and a nonlawyer at that—is probably not surprising).  Madison wrote 
that statutory presidential succession is “an annexation of one office or 
trust to another office.”  Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pen-
dleton (Feb. 21, 1792), in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 235, 236 
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983) (emphasis added).  Madison 
aside, the distinction between an “office” and a “public trust” is one 
which is grounded in the very text of Article VI and is even discussed, 
in passing, in The Federalist.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (distinguish-
ing an “office” under the United States from holders of “public 
trust[s] under the United States”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 376 
(Alexander Hamilton) ( J.R. Pole ed., 2005) (“If it be a public trust or 
office in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there 
is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity.” (em-
phasis added)) . 
Simply put, Washington’s response (or, perhaps more accurately, 
his and his contemporaries’ nonresponse) to receiving the key to the 
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Bastille indicates that the President is not an “Office[r] . . . under the 
United States,” as that phrase is used in the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, and, therefore, it seems to follow that the Incompatibility 
Clause, using (nearly) identical operative words, has no application to 
Presidents.  And as I indicated above, I could advance similar hyper-
formalistic arguments (i.e., hyperformalistic by modern standards) 
with regard to each and every other clause of the Constitution of 1787  
that also use the language of office and officer. 
Thus, it seems to follow that the Incompatibility Clause poses no 
bar against joint senate-presidential office-holding. 
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REBUTTAL 
Does the Incompatibility Clause Apply to the President? 
Steven G. Calabresi† 
Seth Barrett Tillman has made an ingenious argument for an ut-
terly implausible proposition.  He claims that Presidents of the United 
States can serve simultaneously in Congress as senators or representa-
tives.  As a result, Tillman claims Senator Obama need not resign his 
senate seat after he becomes President.  Tillman is wrong, but he is 
wrong in the enlightening sort of way that suggests he ought to be a 
law professor.  The problem for Tillman is the Incompatibility Clause 
of Article I, Section 6, Clause 2.  This Clause provides that “no person 
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of ei-
ther House during his Continuance in Office.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, 
cl. 2.  Tillman argues that the presidency is not included in the words 
“any Office under the United States.”  He thinks that the President is a 
trustee rather than an officer as is implied by occasional references of 
the framers to the President as being the nation’s Chief Magistrate. 
Discussion of the original public meaning of the Incompatibility 
Clause starts with the word “any.”  The word “any” is used at least 
twenty-eight times in the original Constitution, another twenty-two 
times in the twenty-seven amendments to the Constitution, and it is 
thus used for a grand total of at least fifty times in the amended docu-
ment as it currently stands.  The word “any” means “any,” not “some 
of.”  It is always used in the amended Constitution as a synonym for 
the word “every,” and all the dictionaries old and new I have consulted 
give it that meaning.  Consider two examples beyond the Incompati-
bility Clause’s ban on congressional membership for those holding 
“any Office.”  The Supremacy Clause of Article VI makes federal law 
supreme, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis 
added).  “Any” certainly means “every” here.  Likewise the Due Proc-
ess and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment for-
bid deprivations of due process or equal protection to “any” person 
with “any” again plainly being a synonym for “every.” 
 
† George C. Dix Professor of Constitutional Law, Northwestern University School of 
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How about the original public meaning of the word “office”?  Is 
the presidency an “office” or a “trust” as those words are used in the 
amended Constitution?  The answer is that it is clearly an office.  Arti-
cle I, Section 3, Clause 5 thus says “[t]he Senate shall chuse their 
other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of 
the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the 
United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (emphasis added).  The 
Presidential Oath Clause says that new Presidents must swear to “faith-
fully execute the Office of President of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 1, cl. 8 (emphasis added).  The Twenty-Second Amendment for-
bids citizens from being elected more than twice to “the office of Presi-
dent.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1 (emphasis added).  And, finally 
for good measure, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides for tempo-
rary acting Presidents whenever the President is unable to discharge 
the “duties of his office.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3-4 (emphasis 
added).  In contrast to the Constitution’s four references to the presi-
dency as an office, it is not once described as being a trust. 
Undeterred by this daunting evidence of original public meaning, 
Mr. Tillman argues that, while the presidency is an office, the Presi-
dent is not an officer “under the United States.”  Since the Incom-
patibility Clause applies only to “Offices under the United States,” it 
does not, according to Tillman, apply to the President or Vice Presi-
dent. 
To begin with, the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 18 refers to the President and to all other federal execu-
tive and judicial figures as “Officers” of the “Government of the 
United States.”  Everyone for 219 years has thought that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause uses these words to refer to the President.  
Tillman’s argument thus comes down to the incredibly subtle claim 
that the phrase officer “under” the United States, in the Incompatibil-
ity Clause, means something different from the phrase officer “of the 
Government of the United States” in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  This is highly implausible because no reasonable Framer 
could possibly have expected the public to perceive different mean-
ings based on such subtle changes of wording.  Is the presidency not 
an Office “under the United States?”  Of course it is.  The United 
States is represented in the Constitution by the sovereign “We the 
People.”  The presidency is as much an office “under” the power of 
We the People as are judgeships or the Chief Justiceship.  Thus when 
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the Oath Clause of Article VI requires that all federal and state execu-
tive and judicial officers take oaths to uphold the Constitution the 
Clause is clearly referring to the President, the Vice President and to 
state governors as well as to all federal and state judges.  There is no 
sense here that Presidents, Vice Presidents, or governors are trustees 
and not officers in the way the words are used. 
But, says Tillman, phrases such as “Office under the United 
States” and “Officer of the United States” are legal terms of art in the 
document with specialized meaning, just as the phrase “ex post facto 
law” is a legal term of art that refers only to retroactive criminal laws 
and not to retroactive civil laws.  This is the case even though in Latin 
the phrase would appear to refer to both as a matter of plain mean-
ing. 
Tillman is right about the Ex Post Facto Laws Clauses being a legal 
term of art with a specialized meaning because those words had their 
origins in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and were so described in 
Blackstone’s Commentaries.  By the time the Constitution was written 
and ratified, the phrase “ex post facto law” had indeed acquired a spe-
cialized and distinctive meaning.  Nothing of the sort can be said as to 
“Office under the United States,” a term unmentioned in the English 
Bill of Rights or by Blackstone.  Its original meaning quite obviously 
depends on the original meaning of “office,” of “under,” and of “the 
United States.”  We have already seen that the Constitution repeatedly 
describes the presidency as an office.  And, it is just as obvious that the 
presidency, which is created and given its powers in Article II, is “un-
der the United States,” the People of which create the Constitution in 
the Preamble.  It may well be that the King of England in 1789 was not 
an officer “under” the kingdom of Great Britain, but the President is 
most certainly an officer under the United States, the people of which 
are sovereign. 
But, one might ask what the general practice was in 1787 as to 
kings or colonial governors serving in the legislature?  Was it com-
monplace for kings or colonial governors to serve simultaneously in 
the legislature?  Absolutely not!  The whole point of the two houses of 
the British Parliament was to give the Lords temporal and spiritual a 
place in the House of Lords and the commoners their own distinct 
house—the House of Commons.  It was said that when these two 
houses took action, together with the King in Parliament, the law 
could be changed.  Implicit in this is the idea that Kings could not by 
definition be members of Parliament.  If they were, they would have 
been parlaying or talking to themselves.  Likewise, colonial governors, 
although advised by executive councils, did not sit as members of co-
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lonial legislatures.  The office of governor was distinct and separate 
from, for example, the office of a member of the House of Burgesses.  
Practice under the U.S. Constitution has never allowed sitting mem-
bers of Congress to serve in the presidency.  No one has ever before in 
219 years held the presidency while serving as a member of Congress, 
and the two sitting senators elected to the presidency, Warren G. 
Harding and John F. Kennedy, both resigned their senate seats upon 
becoming President. 
Original public meaning and consistent Anglo-American practice 
suggests that Tillman is wrong about the meaning of the phrase “Of-
fice under the United States.”  What then of the three clauses he relies 
on to conclude most illogically that the presidency is not an “Office 
under the United States?” 
Tillman makes much of the fact that the Impeachment Clause of 
Article II, Section 4 applies to “the President, Vice President and all 
civil officers of the United States.”  He notes that the Committee of 
Style took the word “other” out of earlier drafts of this clause, and 
Tillman argues this was a deliberate attempt by the framers to show 
that the President was not a civil officer of the United States.  
Tillman’s argument fails for several reasons.  First, the omission of the 
word “other” could easily have been made, and probably was made, 
for the reason that it was redundant.  Since the Constitution twice re-
ferred to the presidency as an “office,” there was simply no need here 
to repeat that the President was a civil officer of the United States.  
The idea that the framers, by this very subtle omission, meant to allow 
Presidents to serve simultaneously as members of Congress strains 
credulity.  And this is leaving aside the fact that we know of the omis-
sion only from notes of the Convention that were not published until 
long after the Constitution had gone into effect and that were not sup-
posed to have any legal effect.  Tillman’s argument here is from a se-
cret legislative history that does not bear at all on the original public 
meaning of the constitutional text. 
Tillman next makes much of the Commissions Clause of Article II, 
Section 3, which says the President “shall” (i.e., “must”) commission 
“all the Officers of the United States.”  Tillman notes here that Wash-
ington did not commission himself, his Vice President, or his succes-
sor and that, in fact, no President or Vice President has ever received 
a commission.  From this, Tillman infers that Presidents and Vice 
Presidents are not officers of the United States.  This is Tillman’s best 
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argument.  The verb commission has long been used to refer to a 
document that empowers some official to act. 
Washington himself set our practice on this by taking his oath of 
office at a formal inauguration ceremony in front of members of 
Congress and of the general public, but it is true that he did not 
commission himself, his Vice President, or his successor.  The most 
likely explanation is that English monarchs, on whom the presidency 
is partially modeled, issued commissions to those whom they ap-
pointed but not to themselves or their Princes of Wales.  Our practice 
of not commissioning Presidents and Vice Presidents is thus a func-
tion of the fact that, like Kings, they take office in a public ceremony 
with elements of a coronation, and there is a magic moment when the 
powers of office become invested in them which is when they take the 
oath of office.  There is simply no need for a signed commission to 
prove that Presidents and Vice Presidents have been invested with 
power while there is often such a need as to lesser officials.  Washing-
ton’s failure to commission thus looks far more like an understand-
able oversight on his part than it does like a deliberate decision in fa-
vor of the highly implausible conclusion that Presidents and Vice 
Presidents are not officers of the United States.  Tillman’s argument 
on the Commission Clause is 100% an argument from practice, and it 
is defeated by the observation that there is an eight-hundred-year-long 
Anglo-American practice of Kings and Presidents never ever sitting si-
multaneously as members of Parliament or Congress.  His argument 
as to the Foreign Emoluments Clause is foreclosed for the same rea-
sons. 
The question whether a President is an officer or a trustee is easily 
answered by looking at Article II, Sections 1, 2, and 3.  The President 
is plainly the chief executive officer of our government and not the 
chairman of its board of directors.  The conclusion that one could si-
multaneously represent and respond to the people of a congressional 
district or state and to the people of the nation as a whole is more 
than just counterintuitive.  It is contrary to the plain meaning of the 
constitutional text and to the way we have done things for eight hun-
dred years. 
